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Abstract - This paper presents a model of oligopolistic competition under  horizontal 
differentiation of products and a triangular distribution of consumers. The triangular distribution 
aims to represent a case of concentration of consumers around the central location. The main result 
is that a good deal of differentiation among products is achieved also under such assumption 
concerning the consumers’ distribution. This means that the incentive to differentiate – to some 
extent - prevails on the incentive to the central location, although consumers are concentrated in 
the central location. The analysis on an original empirical case-study is presented, concerning the 
choice of beverage retails in a town. The empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical 
model. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 This paper considers a duopoly under endogenous horizontal 
differentiation. 
An intuitive approach to this problem is represented by location models 
which starts from Hotelling’s contribute in 1929. In his model, Hotelling (1929) 
argues that the utility function may assume different levels among consumers 
according to their location over the [0,l] delimited linear space. Hotelling’s result, 
achieved under uniform distribution of consumers, is as follows: in a game where 
firms choose product varieties simultaneously and non-cooperatively, expecting to 
receive the equilibrium profits as pay-off, similar products are produced. This 
phenomenon is the so-called "Principle of Minimum Differentiation". 
Since Hotelling (1929) a vast body of literature concerning product 
differentiation in terms of spatial competition has been developed. In particular, 
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this literature shows that the game equilibrium as defined by Hotelling is weak 
because firms, for some given locations, find more profitable adopting 
undercutting strategies. 
A significant contribute to Hotelling (1929)'s model in that sense is given 
by D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). They show that, within such a 
market, the problem of non-existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium in the 
price stage arises from the fact that consumers  located – basing on their most 
preferred variety – close to one of  market’s edges are captured by their closest 
firm for a large range of prices but not for every price. Indeed, at some (low) level 
of price, these consumers are “lured” by the distant firm. This circumstance 
creates incentives to expel from the market the opponent firm in order to be 
monopolist and, in turns, makes impossible a price equilibrium. 
D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz e Thisse (1979), by means of the introduction 
of a quadratic transportation cost function, solved this problem achieving the 
“Maximum Differentiation Principle”: firms fix their product’s specification at the 
opposite side of the market.  
Economides (1986) - defining a zero relocation tendencies area - 
enounces more general conditions concerning the effects of the transportation cost 
function on market equilibrium.   
The purpose of this paper consists in empirically investigate the robustness 
of the “Maximum Differentiation Principle”, using a different consumers’ 
distribution. Indeed, in Hotelling (1929)’s model consumers are assumed to be 
uniformly distributed, but in the real world often consumers tastes are gathered 
around a central value of a specific product characteristic. In addition, thinking to 
location purely in a geographical sense, we expect to observe people concentrated 
toward the central location1. 
A triangular consumers distribution is introduced in order to stress this 
occurrence. The analysis shows that, even if consumers are gathered around the 
central location, minimum differentiation is not profitable. 2 
                                                 
1 For a general exposure of some of these models see: Carraro and Graziano (1993), 
Garella and Lambertini (2000) and in an optics related to the problems of urban 
geography Cori  et al. (1993) 
  
2 However, the validity of the Principle of Minimum Differentiation could be not 
completely excluded. Jehiel(1992), for example, shows that if firms play an infinite (or 
unknown) number of repetition of the two-stages game, they can collude in the price-
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The final part of this paper presents empirical evidence concerning 
location-choice and price-choice of beverage retail in Catania (Italy). The analysis 
focuses on a refreshing drink, made using water, lemon and mandarin which is a 
traditional commodity of Catania’s folk culture. Since the productive process is 
very simple, two drinks may differ for their sale location only, just as assumed by 
models here considered. This analysis shows that central location might coexist 
with high price, differently by standard model prediction.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 preliminary results are 
summarized pointing out the relevance of transportation cost function to the 
equilibrium existence. Section 3 introduces a model under triangular distribution 
of consumers presented as a particular parameter restriction of a set of trapezoidal 
distribution. Section 4 briefly shows data concerning empirical evidence about 
beverage retails in Catania. Some comments and concluding remarks are provided 
in section 5.  
  
2. Some points of the relevant literature. 
 
This section describes the analytical framework of the basic model of location 
under uniform distribution of consumers referring to various authors. 
First, the linear transportation cost function case is analysed. Then I will 
show some result about quadratic transportation cost. Some general conditions 
concerning equilibrium existence are also enounced at the end of this section. 
 To begin with, let consider a linear city in the [0,1] interval delimited 
space. Within this city is assumed existing a continuum of individuals differing in 
one dimension only: their location according to the type of commodity they prefer 
most. These individuals are uniformly distributed and each consumer takes at 
most one unit of the product which are  produced at zero marginal costs.   
Each consumer prefers to buy their good exactly where he is localised, so 
that, if a consumer has to go from his location to a different location in order to 
purchase the good, he pays an additional  transportation cost. Hence, a consumer 
of type m, 0<m<1, has an utility function expressed  in monetary terms as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                     
stage. In this case, because of a soft strategic-effect, each firms chooses central location.  
This point will be discussed at the end of the analysis. 
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 )(dfpsU m −−=   [2.1] 
 
where s index the “gross” benefit by consuming the good (i.e. if provided exactly 
in the consumer’s location and regardless of the price paid for it)  p is the price, d 
is the distance between m and the sell point xi, that is, mxd i −= , and  f(d) is an 
increasing function of this distance. Moreover,  f(d)p +  is the so-called delivered 
price. 
This utility function may assume different forms; however it shows a peak 
when  p and d are equal to zero and this peak value is s. This means that each 
consumer gains the same satisfaction if we ignore prices and transportation cost.  
 Economides (1986) propose to express this transport cost in the following 
form 
 
 21,0;)( ≤≤>−⋅= δδ tmxtdf i  [2.2] 
 
where the parameter t can be interpreted as a sensibility index of the importance 
of consumers’ preferred specification for consumers them self, or, in a spatial 
way, it may seen like a consumer’s “idleness” index. 
Note that if t is the same among consumers, this means that each consumer 
presents an identical sense of distance.  
The parameterδ is used to introduce different form of  transportation cost 
function. For example, a linear transportation cost can be obtained if 1=δ , and 
also a quadratic function might be achieved by fixing 2=δ . 
 Note that from [2.1] arise a condition, depending both on price and 
distance, that must be verified if m-th  individual decide to purchase the 
commodity  
  
 )(0 dfpsU m +≥⇔≥   [2.3] 
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Thus, the m-th consumer gains an utility which is at least equal to total 
purchase cost. This condition has a crucial role within this market3. 
 Before developing  formal analysis, I will provide an intuitive approach to 
these issues.  Intuition behind the formal analysis may be explained as follows. 
We have to answer to these questions: if two firms cover this market producing 
homogeneous goods, central location is profitable for both firm? Or, by contrast, 
is it more profitable to maintain a certain distance from the rival one? And, 
finally, what we can say about prices fixed within this market? 
 Obviously, a central location not only provides an higher number of 
consumers (that is the so-called demand-effect), but also implies a strong price-
competition (so-called strategic-effect). Thus, central location has two opposite 
effects. This simple argument shows the most important characteristic of this 
market: firm’s behaviours are interdependent both in price-stage and location-
stage.  
 Hotelling (1929) was the first to use a spatial approach to this issue. Here I 
refer to Hay e Morris (1979)’s version of Hotelling’s “Main Street” model.  
According to considerations about interdependence mentioned above the 
competition between firms is described by mean of a two-stage, perfect 
information game. While in the second stage each firm use  price as strategic 
variable, in the first stage firms choose their  product specifications (location) 
expecting to receive the payoff that corresponds to the Nash equilibrium in prices 
strategies (i.e. given the second stage result). 
In order to investigate the Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the 
game we need to the express the demand function for each firm. Clearly, this 
demand depends on firms’ location. Let a and b−1  ( )0, ≥ba  be the firms’ distance 
from 0, thus firm’ location in [0,1] space will be ,1, 21 bxax −==  x1≤ x2 . 
Note that if 0=+ ba  we have the maximum degree of differentiation. If, 
instead, 1=+ba  firms are localised in the same point. Thus, on the first case we 
have a soft strategic effect and, by contrast, in the second one, firms face the 
maximum degree of price competition. In particular, if firms choose the same 
location, their profit collapse to zero due to an à la Bertrand competition. 
                                                 
3 In this one-dimension world, the demand function is very peculiar, since each consumer 
buys either zero or one unit of good; a neoclassical concept like “marginal utility”, and its 
relationship with price, is pointless. 
7 
  Given 21, xx  we are able to individuate the consumer who is indifferent  
between buying from firm 1 at price 1p  or from firm 2 at price 2p , because he 
gains the same utility. In fact, if both prices respect condition expressed in [2.3]  
in this market consumers have to choose between two possibility arising from two 
prices and two transport costs; nevertheless, it will be a consumer who is 
indifferent between the two possibilities. Let m* be the indifferent consumer as 
defined by following [2.4]  
  
 *22*11 mxtpmxtp −⋅+=−⋅+   [2.4]  
 
Hence, all consumers on the left side of m* prefer (buying from) firm 1 
and, all consumers on the right side of  m* prefer firm 2, moreover we obtain the 
demand of firm 1 and firm 2 by solving with respect to m* equation [2.4] and 
substituting  x1=a bx −= 12 .  
 The demand function for the two firms are respectively: 
 
 
t
ppbaappD
22
1),( 21211
−−−−+=  [2.5a] 
t
ppbabppD
22
1),( 12122
−−−−+=  [2.5b]  
 
 Note that each demand is constituted not only by a positive term which 
represents exactly its location (plus a term equal to the half of consumers who are 
contained between the two firms) but also by a negative term which shows the 
effect of the price differential. If considered in absolute value, this last term is 
increasing  on the “new” price-variable defined as ijj ppp −='  with j ≠ i.     
 By observing the two [2.5] the parameter t can viewed as unity of 
measurement  of price differential: the higher is 2t the less will be )2/(' tp j  . 
 Since equation [2.4] shows that each firm can enlarge its market share by 
fixing a price lower than the rival firm’s price, each firm can have some incentive 
to lower the price to subtract  market share to the rival one. 
8 
 A possible strategy for every enterprise is then that to move the price 
downward thin arriving to such level that allows to serve alone the whole market 
(this level of price is well known as  price of exclusion).  
 In the case a firm decides to cohabit with the other firm, it will be fixed a 
price higher than the exclusion price. Between the two possible (exclusion or not 
exclusion) strategies it will exist a price which acts as threshold, that once 
achieved collapses the market into a monopoly. 
 This threshold conceptually corresponds to the case in which the 
indifferent consumer exactly coincides with the rival firm location. To easily 
realize this, it is enough to consider that if, let us say, the enterprise 1 fixed the 
price according to the rule: 
 
 )1(21 batpp −−−=  [2.6] 
 
the indifferent consumer would be exactly the consumer located in 2x . So, if the 
enterprise 1 sets a price that more than compensates the cost of transport, that is, 
 
)1(21 batpp −−−<  [2.7]   
 
then any consumer would purchase from the enterprise 2.  
 Hence, through an opportune price strategy, the enterprise 1 will become 
monopolist.  
 The consequence is that to continue the oligopoly analysis the following 
condition must be set on the prices 
 
 )1()1( 12 batppbat −−+≤−≤−−−   [2.8] 
  
 Hence, equilibrium prices ( ** p,p 21 ) of oligopoly game may exist only in 
the dominion defined by [2.8], in which both enterprises have a positive market 
share.  
 Finally, note that if prices satisfy equation [2.8], the indifferent consumer 
will be positioned between the two enterprises. 
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 Each firm aim to maximize profit function represented by a function of the 
type )),().,(,,(),(),( bapbapbaDbapba jiiii =Π  that depends on the decisions on 
location and price of both the enterprises.   
 By differentiating the firms' profit functions and solving the first order 
condition with respect to prices, we find the well known reaction functions: 
 
 ⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
++−=⇒=∂
Π∂
+−+=⇒=∂
Π∂
12
1)1(
22
0
2
2
2
1
)1(
21
0
1
1
2
pbatp
p
pba
t
p
p
  [2.9] 
 
The Nash equilibrium in prices is therefore: 
 
 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=
3
1),(*1
batbap   [2.10a] 
 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−=
3
1),(*2
batbap   [2.10b] 
 
equilibrium prices have the following property: they are increasing on t, 
coherently with the circumstance that higher levels of t "damp" the price effect on 
the demand function: if the distance is relatively less important than the price, 
prices are pushed upward and vice versa; they decrease, instead, when the 
enterprises are close, because  this involves a sourer price competition  
 By substituting equilibrium prices into profit functions we obtain the 
following equilibrium profits.   
 
 
2
*
1 3
1
2
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=Π bat  [2.11a]  
 
2
*
1 3
1
2
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−=Π bat  [2.11b] 
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in order that the couple ( ** ,pp 21 ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium, it is not sufficient 
that it assures the profit maximization within  the interval defined by [2.9], but it 
has to generate  a level of profit higher than the profit that firm would get in 
monopoly, excluding the rival one. Thus, the following conditions must be 
verified:  
 
 mbatpbatpp 1*22*2*11 ))1(()3
1(
2
),( Π=−−−−≥−+=Π ε  [2.12a]  
With respect to firm 1 and 
mbatpbatpp 2
*
1
2*
2
*
12 ))1(()3
1(
2
),( Π=−−−−≥−−=Π ε  [2.12b] 
With respect to firm 2.  
  
Clearly, until both firms are present in the market, it does not exist a 
reciprocally best choice which is different to the couple ( ** ,pp 21 ); the unique 
alternative credible strategy would consist in expelling from the market the rival 
firm, and it is exactly the convenience of this strategy that we have to study. 
 Undoubtedly, each firm is interested in serving the whole market, by 
practicing the highest price. Thus, we evaluate what happens for 0→ε , studying 
the system of the following conditions 
 
 )2(
3
4
3
1
2
baba +≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+  [2.13a]  
 )2(
3
4
3
1
2
abab +≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+  [2.13b] 
 
Conditions [2.13a,b] imply that the couple ( ** ,pp 21 ) represents a situation of 
equilibrium in which it is convenient the cohabitation, only for specific 
configurations of the possible relative positions of the two firms (that is, for 
specific parameter combinations) 
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Note that conditions [2.13a,b] on the location  are necessary and sufficient 
for the existence of the equilibrium in oligopoly, since if they are satisfied, 
condition [2.8] will be also satisfied. 
The conclusion driven in literature is that prices ( ** ,pp 21 ) that bring the 
market into an equilibrium with positive profits for both enterprises, do not induce 
tendencies to eliminate the competitors from the market, only for a subset of the 
first-stage select positions.  
In order to answer to the question on the location stage, it will be enough 
to solve the profit maximisation first order condition with respect to a and b 
respectively. In fact, a and b  are the strategic variables of the decisional node here 
considered. In this way we obtain 
 
 0
3
1
3
*
1 >⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=∂
Π∂ bat
a
 [2.14a] 
 0
3
1
3
*
2 >⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−=∂
Π∂ bat
b
 [2.14b] 
    
At a first glance, it could seem that in this market a natural tendency exists, 
leading firms to converge toward the centre, up to place both firms exactly in the 
central position. But, it has already been noticed that the profit function is not 
continuous in a and  b, since it presents a discontinuity  for a+b=1: in such a case 
profits are null. 
       This circumstance implicates the existence of a tension among the two 
enterprises that are pushed to estrange from the centre to have positive profits. But 
they do not move at all toward an equilibrium: in fact, either they get further in 
such way that conditions [2.13] is satisfied, and then it becomes convenient for 
both to move once more toward the centre, following the rule drawn by  [2.14], or 
they get further without  [2.13] conditions are respected  and in that case we have 
already shown that an equilibrium does not exist.  
 Therefore, we can conclude  that, in the first stage of the game - 
concerning location - none equilibrium exists in pure strategies, so that a sub-
game perfect equilibrium does not exist in the whole game. To avoid this 
drawback, it is possible to modify some hypotheses introduced above concerning 
the parameters, without shaking the general framework. 
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A possible way to operate consists in removing the hypothesis of linearity 
of the transport function, simply setting 2=δ  into equation [2.2]. The 
transportation cost function so modified assumes the form 
 
 2)()( mxtdf i −=  [2.15] 
 
The argument proposed by D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) 
can be summarised in the following terms: given that the equilibrium problem 
comes from the fact that when firms are close to the centre, small reductions of 
prices allow them to serve the whole market acting as monopolist, then the 
solution is to eliminate this discontinuity in profit function.   
This change imposes to reconsider both stages of the game. 
       New indifference condition becomes4: 
 
 ( ) ( )2221 1 mbtpamtp −−+=−+  [2.16]   
 
Solving with respect to m the new demand functions we obtain the modified 
equilibrium conditions. Focusing the attention to the first stage where firms 
choose their position, the following [2.17] shows that if 110 ≤−≤≤ ba is hold, then 
profit function derivative are negative on a and b for both firm 1 and firm 2. Or 
rather, in the second stage of the game both oligopolists are interested to get 
further and to place themselves into the two opposite edges of the market, because 
the profit function is decreasing in a and b respectively. 
 
  02
2
11*
1
1 <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂=∂
Π∂
a
p
p
D
a
Dp
a
  [2.17a] 
01
1
22*
2
2 <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂=∂
Π∂
b
p
p
D
b
Dp
b
  [2.17b] 
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 The existence of equilibrium strategies for both stages of the game assures, 
in turn, also the existence of a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the whole game. It 
emerges, therefore, in an enough predictable way, the role of the transportation  
function as element which is able to influence the existence itself of the 
equilibrium.  
 Economides (1986) shows, in fact, that from different values assumed by δ 
into the [1,2] interval, it arises  the existence or inexistence of equilibrium 
strategies, according to the following rule: 
• If ∈δ [1; 1,26] perfect equilibrium doesn't exist in the pure strategies of the 
game;   
• if ∈δ [5/3; 2] a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which 
),,(),,( 21 δδ ba,pbap **  are a Nash equilibrium in the price-stage, and, in the 
location-stage the principle of the maximum differentiation is verified.  
• if ∈δ [1,26; 5/3], finally, we can find a sub-game perfect equilibrium. 
Equilibrium locations defined by ;
4
35)(*1
δδ −=x   
4
13)(1)( *1
*
2
−=−= δδδ xx . 
 Thus, in the third case, 0*1 >x  1*2 <x , it is an open question whether we 
observe a weak demonstration of the maximum or minimum differentiation 
principle. 
 Until this point  the hypothesis of  uniform distribution of consumer along 
the linear segment representing the market has been maintained. Nevertheless, it 
is easy to check that this kind of distribution it is not a very likely one. 
 Therefore, next section proposes to modify the model considering a 
different (and more realistic) consumers’ distribution. A quadratic transportation 
cost hypothesis is maintained.  
 
3. The basic-model under triangular consumers’ distribution 
 
This section introduces a model under the hypothesis of triangular distribution of 
consumers.  
                                                                                                                                     
4 This follows from the fact that derivative of 
2m , i.e. m2 , is never equal for two different 
values of m of the same sign, so that generalised price curves can cross, but never 
coincide, given the firms are not located at the same point.  
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 Indeed, in the real world often we observe distributions which have a peak  
around their central value, also when they refer - as in Benassi Chirco (2008) - to 
preferences around one determined product characteristic.  
 The distribution that I introduce is triangular and does not change total 
market dimension; even referring to the normal distribution, it does not exactly 
reproduce its form because it is more angular; nevertheless, it is evident that this 
difference regarding the form of the two distribution, does not change the 
underlying intuition: triangular distribution, with a great degree of analytical 
simplicity, represents a population "thickened" around the central location5. 
A distribution with this form has as density function as the following [3.1]  
 
 ⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≤<−
≤≤
=
1
2
144
2
104
)(
mperm
mperm
xf   [3.1] 
 
therefore, the corresponding distribution function is 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≤<−+−
≤≤
=
1
2
1142
2
102
)(
2
2
mpermm
mperm
mF   [3.2]  
 
In what follows, I focus on a precise research questions: does this different 
consumers distribution imply some effect on equilibrium? Rather: should we 
expect that the two firms will certainly place themselves in the central position, 
where a great density is observed, or by contrast it  exists a possibility that a 
certain degree of differentiation inside this market is maintained? 
Preliminarily, as noticed by Scrimitore (2003), it is worthwhile observing 
that [3.1] represents a particular case of a whole set of density functions that 
                                                 
5 On property of triangular distributions see Johnson et al. (1995) and  among recent 
applications of this distribution see Benassi, Cellini and Chirco (1999); Scrimitore 
(2005). For the most general approach to problems related to equilibrium existence see 
Anderson, Goeree, and Ramer (1997). 
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describes trapezoidal distributions reporting an elevated degree of concentration 
around the central position up to collapse into a triangle6. 
Distributions of this type are defined by the following [3.3] 
2
2
4 1,
1 2
2 1 1( , ) ,
1 2 2
4 1,
1 2
m m
f m m m
m m
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ ϕϕ ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
⎧ −<⎪ −⎪⎪⎪ − +⎪= < <⎨ +⎪⎪⎪ +⎪ <⎪ −⎩
  [3.3] 
Hence, consumers, indexed with m, are distributed over the interval [0;1] 
according to a density function ( )ϕ,mf  where the parameter ϕ  can be interpreted 
as a concentration index of the consumers' tastes, or simply as a consumers 
concentration index. If ϕ  is equal to 1, then [3.3] describes a uniform distribution. 
If, by contrast, ϕ  is equal to zero the function collapses into a triangle. And, also, 
as ϕ  decreases, tending to zero, the distribution function concentrates toward the 
centre.  
Therefore, under the distribution described by equation [3.3] the number of 
consumers contained into an interval varies depending on this interval’s extremes. 
  In order to define the "new" demand function it is necessary taking into 
account this circumstance. Therefore,  let a and b denote respectively the distance 
of the firm 1 and 2 from the origin. Consequently,  
 
 aab
ab
pp
m +−+−
−= ][
2
1 12*   [3.4] 
 
is the location of the indifferent consumer (and supposing as above that this 
consumer is localised between the two firms) the demand functions become 
),(1 ϕmFD =  and ),(12 ϕmFD −= , which can be written in the following way 
                                                 
6 Note that this density is a trapezoid, with longest base equal to 1, shortest base equal to 
ϕ  w and altitude equal to ϕ+1
2  and it is also easy to check that if 0=ϕ  is hold [3.3] 
became equal to the equation [3.1]. 
 
16 
 
b]5.3[
1
)1(
2
1
1
a]5.3[
1
)1(
2
1
12
2
12
1
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
+
−+++−
−
−=
+
−+++−
−
=
ab
ab
pp
D
ab
ab
pp
D
  
 
 Notice that it is possible to see a strategic effect and a demand effect in this 
market, by observing that 1D  not only has a positive term which represents 
location of firm 1 (“a”), but also has a positive term which represents the price 
differential ( 12 pp − ) discounted by a factor that expresses the intervening distance 
between them (b-a).  
  A last comment on )1( −ϕ : it can be interpreted as an index of the 
divergence from the uniform distribution that directly acts to modify the demand 
function. 
      Once obtained  the demand functions, in order to obtain the profit functions it 
is sufficient multiplying them for the price 
 
 ϕ
ϕ
π +
−+++−
−
=
1
)1(
2
112
11
ab
ab
pp
p   [3.6a] 
 ]
1
)1(
2
1
1[
12
22 ϕ
ϕ
π +
−+++−
−
−=
ab
ab
pp
p  [3.6b] 
 
from them the following reaction functions can be computed 
 
 ))]((
2
1[
2
1 22
21 abbaabpp −++−−+= ϕ   [3.7a] 
 ))]()(3(
2
1[
2
1 22
12 abbaabpp −++−+−= ϕ  [3.7b] 
 
therefore the price-stage has an equilibrium ),( *2*1 pp with  
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 )(
2
1)(
6
1)(
3
1 22*
1 abababp −+−+−= ϕ   [3.8a] 
 )(
2
1)(
6
5)(
3
1 22*
2 ababbap −+−+−= ϕ   [3.8b] 
  
The reaction functions and the consequent equilibrium prices gives rise to 
an interesting point: as consumers distribution differs from the uniform one, prices 
register a downward tendency. To easily check this circumstance, it is sufficient  
noting that ϕ  only compares in  the term )(
2
1 ab −ϕ  - representing the  distance 
between enterprises damped from ϕ  - and that, in turn, )(
2
1 ab −ϕ  decreases as 
ϕ passes from 0  - i.e. uniform distribution – to 1 representing the triangular 
distribution case.  
 In the location-stage we need to find the positions that reciprocally 
constitute the best answer to the rival firm’s profit maximizing behaviour given 
prices ),( *2*1 pp .  
Since profit functions, given ),( *2*1 pp , are the  following [3.9] 
 
 ϕ
ϕϕπ +
+++−+−+−=
1
31)(2)](
2
1)(
6
1)(
3
1[
6
1 22*
1
abababab  [3.9a] 
ϕ
ϕϕπ +
+−+−−−+−=
1
)(235)](
3
1)(
2
1)(
6
5[
6
1 22*
2
babaabab  [3.9b]   
 
reaction functions with respect to location are represented by 
 
6
1
2
1
3
1* −−= ϕba  [3.10a] 
6
5
2
1
3
1* ++= ϕab  [3.10b] 
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 Note that a tendency to differentiation in the uniform distribution ( 1=ϕ ) 
case is hold, while if  the degree of concentration  increases, a tendency toward 
the center arises. The optimal location for firms results in: 
 
 ϕ
8
3
8
1* −=a   [3.11a] 
 ϕ
8
3
8
7* +=b   [3.11b] 
 
 Nevertheless, it is worth to stress the circumstance that the choice of 
central position does not emerge as (reciprocal) optimal strategy (i.e. 
2/1** ≠≠ ba  ). Thus we have forces that leading duopolists to maintain product 
differentiation. 
 For completeness, the equilibrium prices can be computed as follow 
       
 2*2
*
1 8
3
4
3
8
3 ϕϕ ++== pp   [3.12] 
 
 The indifferent consumer is, finally, located in m = ½.  
  So, even in the limit-case 0=ϕ  that describes the triangular distribution,  
firms have not convenience to take the central position; indeed, the equilibrium 
involves location on  the tails of the market.   
 This result is rather counterintuitive: high central density would make 
profitable to localize around the middle in a way to exploit in a maximum 
measures the demand effect; what is recorded, instead, is a light movement toward 
the centre; this firm’s behaviour implies that an high degree of differentiation 
inside this market is preserved despite central consumers “high mass”. 
 Can we affirm that the central location will never be chosen? In reality it is 
necessary to underline the hypothesis that firm are not able to collude, still  hold 
in the analysis developed above. Nevertheless, it is evident, that this is a very 
strong hypothesis which represents a debatable point. 
  At margin should be noted that Jehiel (1992) defines, for instance, a 
scenario within wich, if the game is repeated an endless number of times, firms 
are able to collude on price and, so doing, to get high profits through high prices; 
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hence, once neutralized the strategic effect, the central position is preferred 
(reciprocal convenient).  
 
4. An empirical analysis on the kiosks in Catania 
 
Similarly to Liarte and Forgues (2008) with  respect to hamburger 
restaurants in Paris, this section proposes an  empirical analysis concerning  the 
most important drink kiosks in Catania7. 
While theoretical models distinguish the location stage from the price stage, in 
the real world, only the final outcome can be observed. Thus, I will try to “photograph" 
this result trying also to reconstruct the underlying dynamics. 
 At this end location and prices of more diffused  products have been recorded.  
Locations are situated (in very precise way) on two axis: Via Umberto-axis and 
Via Etnea-axis. On the first axis insists the kiosks of Piazza Iolanda, Via Umberto, and 
Piazza Trento. On the Via Etnea-axis we found those of Piazza Santo Spirito, Piazza 
Carlo Alberto, Piazza Borsa, and Via Santa Maddalena. The goods for which prices have 
been recorded are: "Mandarin and Lemon" (ML), " Almond Milk " (LM) and the folk 
drink "Soda, Lemon and Salt" (SL). 
Data are presented in the following Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Kiosks here considered are located in some points that clearly hold different activities 
tied up to the modern concept of "city": the kiosk of Piazza Spirito Santo has as basin of 
use the so-called "City" of Catania given the presence of different financial institutions, 
the two kiosks of Piazza Borsa and S.Agata La Vetere serve the zone close to the 
Chamber of Commerce and of the Faculty of Low. Kiosks located in "Piazza Carlo 
Alberto" have the vocation to serve the fruit and vegetable’s market that is hold in the 
same square every day. Finally, kiosks in Via Umberto, with those of Piazza Iolanda and 
Piazza Trento, serve the arteries with elegant stores. 
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Table 1 - Prices of drink kiosks in the city of Catania. 
 
Via Umberto-axis 
 
DRINK LOCATION  FIRM 
          
Mandarin and 
Lemon       
Soda 
Lemon 
and Salt    
Almond 
Milk 
Piazza Iolanda Giammona 
 
 0,90  0,70  1,20 
Piazza 
Umberto 
Vezzosi 
 
 1,00  0,75  1,20 
Giammona  1,00  0,75  1,50  
      
Piazza Trento Sava               
0,90 
          
0,70 
            
1,30 
 
Via Etnea-axis 
DRINK LOCATION  FIRM 
Mandarin and 
Lemon       
Soda 
Lemon 
and Salt   
Almond 
Milk 
Piazza Borsa Cremino  1,00  0,80  1,35 
Piazza Carlo 
Alberto 
Guarrera  0,90  0,70  1,30 
Tappeti  0,80  0,65  1,00  
      
Piazza S.Spirito 
 
Via Santa 
Maddalena 
Costa 
 
S. Agata La 
Vetere 
              
0,90 
 
                        
0,80 
          
0,70 
 
          
0,60 
            
1,20 
 
            
1,00 
Prices are in euros, recorded in May 2005. 
 
  Focusing on the competition which is realized when two firms are 
localised in the same place (there are two cases, one for axis), we can observe 
price differential to notice that price competition in Via Umberto (limited to only 
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one product of three products here considered), is less intense than the one along 
the Via Etnea-axis (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2.- Difference in  prices 
Difference in  prices 
 ML SL LM 
Via Umberto  0 0 0.30 
    
Piazza Carlo 
Alberto  0,10 0,05  0,30 
  
 
Could we find some relation among the theory just exposed and the 
empirical evidence here reported? Could we reconcile the cohabitation into the 
centre connected to the highest levels of price recorded in Via Umberto, with the 
situation in Piazza Carlo Alberto, in which the central location is associated with 
the lowest level of recorded prices? 
 These two situations seem in contradiction each other, but both situations 
can be explained in light of theoretical framework introduce above. Indeed,  
central location has a polarizing effect on prices that became higher if a collusive 
agreement is done, as argued by Jehiel (1992), or equal to marginal costs because 
of a à la Bertrand competition. 
 Hence, what happens in Via Umberto can be interpreted as the result of a 
collusive agreement that pushes prices upward and leads both firms to the central 
location. The other situation can be interpreted instead, as the outcome of a 
market in which both stages are played and, since it is evident that in the real 
world location choice is more binding than that the one involving price, 
competitive tensions affects  this last stage. 
 Why collusion is possible along Via Umberto is an open matter. 
Obviously, it depends on behavioural parameters that cannot be inserted into the 
simple model introduced above.  
However, it reasonable the assumption that environmental factors 
conditioning firms behaviour is uniform “across axis” of the same town. 
 Nevertheless, hypothesizing along Via Umberto a triangular distribution 
of the type of that introduced in this article, its "natural" tendency toward the 
centre deriving from this distribution form is able "to facilitate" the collusion on 
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price. While the situation regarding “Piazza Carlo Alberto”, is very similar to the 
hypothesis of uniform distribution as nearly "uniform" is the position of the stands 
there located, therefore being affected by a  smaller incentive to collude. 
  In other words and on extreme synthesis, the “funny” empirical evidence 
related to the drink kiosks, could be interpreted in the sense that consumers 
distribution with a central peak does not imply the realisation of minimum 
differentiation strategy unless firms collude. Nevertheless, it could interpreted as a 
meaningful incentive to the adoption of collusive behaviours on prices. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  
This paper analysed the effects of the consumers concentration towards the 
central localization in the space of product characteristics, in a model of horizontal 
differentiation with quadratic transportation costs. 
   From the vast body of literature developed in this field it is well known 
the importance both of transportation cost function and consumers distribution on 
market equilibrium. 
 This paper pointed to the effects of consumer distribution, considering a 
distribution function nearer to the real world than uniform distribution which is 
generally considered. Indeed, usually in the real world, "extreme positions" have a 
smaller relative weight. 
 Hypothesizing a consumers distribution  not already uniform, but with a 
central peak, the strength of the minimum differentiation principle was verified in 
a different way. I shown, in particular, that even in the case of (symmetrical) 
triangular distribution with central peak, if firms compete in both the price stage 
and in the location stage, they will not adopt central-location strategy. Indeed, 
they will maintain a location next to the market edges. Put differently, firms 
optimal behaviour consists in pushing the indifferent consumer to the centre of the 
unitary segment. 
 In the final part of this paper I developed a very particular empirical 
analysis concerning drink kiosks in the city of Catania. This analysis moved from 
the purpose to analyze in an "original" way  the existing relation between location 
and prices. 
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 The economic interpretation of results is based, not only on models of 
differentiation and competition, but also on the possibility that the duopolist 
conclude collusive agreement on price.  
 Observed behaviours characterized either by central location-elevated 
prices or central location–low prices can be explained, in particular, observing the 
polarizing (upward or downward) effect that the central location exerts on prices.  
 In this context the triangular distribution could be viewed as a possible 
incentive to  collusion, but not sufficient to justify, from itself, firms permanence 
into the central location.  
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